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This dissertation presents a behavioral model of employee ownership and an 
experimental examination of the model.  Chapter 1 reviews literature on employee 
ownership, gift-exchange, social preferences in experimental economics, and in-group 
bias.  The model of employee ownership, presented in Chapter 2, incorporates in-group 
bias into a gift-exchange framework.  Predictions of the model include higher 
productivity, higher profits, higher wages, and greater worker satisfaction in employee 
owned firms relative to otherwise identical publicly traded or private firms with no 
employee ownership.  Chapter 3 presents the results of a laboratory experiment designed 
to test both the assumptions and the predictions of the model described in Chapter 2.  In-
group bias is found to affect the giving and trusting behavior, but not the reciprocal 
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Chapter 1:  Literature 
1.1  Introduction 
 Profit-sharing and employee ownership play a large role in today’s economy, with 
as may as ⅓ to ½ of private sector American workers receiving a portion of their 
employer’s profits1.  Proponents of employee ownership justify and promote the practice 
based on the belief that it increases the productivity and profitability of the firm2.  Yet 
models that attempt to create a causal link from employee ownership to higher 
productivity face several obstacles. 
 An individual worker will only receive a small fraction of the profits produced by 
his/her effort while enduring the entire cost.  As a company grows, N increases, the 
worker’s incentive to improve performance all but vanishes.  This is the classic free-rider 
problem or “1/N” problem.  Any effort agreement amongst employee owners would be 
subject to free-riding.  One might argue that co-workers have an incentive to monitor one 
another under a profit-sharing plan.  However, monitoring is also subject to free-riding if 
there is a significant social or effort cost to monitoring. 
In light of these obstacles, how would one explain the belief that employee 
ownership raises productivity?  Many employees report a ‘we’re all in it together’ 
attitude amongst workers in firms with profit-sharing plans.  Perhaps it is not their own 
profit, but the profit of their co-workers that motivates these workers.  An agent who is 
                                                 
 
1 See Kruse, Blasi & Park (2008). 
2 See Ehrenberg & Milkovich (1987). 
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not purely self-interested may view the profits of her co-worker in a different light than 
the profits of a rich shareholder who is otherwise uninvolved with the company. 
Chapter 2 will model an agent who cares differentially about the profits of her co-
workers and the profits of strangers in a gift-exchange transaction with a firm.  Chapter 3 
describes an experiment that tests both the main assumption and several predictions of 
this model.  The following sections review literature that is relevant to the model, the 
experiment, or both.  Topics covered include employee ownership, gift-exchange, social 
preferences in economic experiments, and in-group bias. 
 
1.2  Employee Ownership 
 The theoretical literature has generally shined a negative light on employee 
ownership in terms of firm profitability and worker well-being, while the empirical 
literature has suggested (though not conclusively) that employee ownership benefits both 
firms and workers.3  In contrast to the vast majority of the previous theoretical literature, 
the model developed in Chapter 2 predicts that employee ownership increases the 
profitability of the firm and the well-being of workers.  Because the model does not draw 
from the theoretical employee ownership literature, this section includes only a brief note 
about that literature.  The argument against profit sharing that gained the most attention 
in the literature is that employee ownership creates perverse incentives due to workers 
having controlling interest in the firm.4  The crux of the problem, according to these 
models, is that employee owners would restrict the amount of labor available to the firm 
                                                 
 
3 Cramton, Mehran & Tracy (2008) provide a notable exception to the theoretical literature, predicting that 
employee ownership will ease negotiations between unions and management. 
4 See Ward (1958), Domar (1966), Meade (1972), and Vanek (1977). 
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and seek to maximize revenues per worker, instead of profits.  See Blair, Kruse & Blasi 
(2000), Dow & Putterman (1999), and Hansmann (1996) for a review of the perverse 
incentive argument and other arguments against employee ownership. 
Empirical research in this area has consistently found a correlation between 
employee ownership or profit sharing plans and firm performance.5  Averages over many 
studies suggest that employee ownership increases productivity by 4 to 5%.6  However, it 
would be a stretch to infer causation from these studies.  Prendergast (1999) and 
Ehrenberg & Milkovich (1987) lay out the argument that firms may differentially select 
into profit sharing plans.  Having recognized that selection issues preclude inferring 
causation from the data, the following paragraphs highlight findings that are consistent 
with other predictions of the behavioral employee ownership model (in Chapter 2). 
Predictions of the behavioral employee ownership model include not only effects 
on firm welfare (productivity and profitability), but also effects on worker welfare (wages 
and worker satisfaction).  Several studies find that wages and worker satisfaction are 
higher in firms with profit sharing or employee ownership plans than in comparable firms 
without any form of profit sharing.  Using data from NBER surveys and questions added 
to the 2002 and 2006 GSS, Kruse, Freeman & Blasi (2008) find that involvement in 
profit sharing programs is correlated with higher pay and benefits, greater job 
satisfaction, and other positive worker outcomes.7 
The employee ownership literature emphasizes human resources policies that 
promote the “all in it together” culture observed in many profit sharing firms.  In case 
                                                 
 
5 See Doucouliagos (1995) and Kruse & Blasi (1995) for meta-analyses.  Also see Core & Guay (2001), 
Lee (2003) and Robinson & Wilson (2006). 
6 See Blasi, Freeman, Mackin & Kruse (2008) and Prendergast (1999). 
7 Also see Kruse & Blasi (1995) and Kardas, Scharf & Keogh (1998). 
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studies, Knez & Simester (2001) find that a firm-wide incentive scheme increased 
employee performance at Continental Airlines and Bruner & Brownlee (1990) find that 
both employees and non-employee stockholders benefited from Polaroid’s creation of an 
Employee Stock Ownership Plan.8  Blasi, Freeman, Mackin & Kruse (2008) stress the 
importance of the interaction between profit sharing programs and other corporate 
policies.  Though the behavioral model described in Chapter 2 does not rely on other 
company policies, it may be imbedded into a richer model where human resource policies 
matter.  These ideas will be discussed further in Section 2.5: Extensions of the Model. 
 
1.3  Gift-Exchange 
 The idea that concerns about wage fairness might influence a worker’s effort 
decision, and therefore the wage offer made by the firm was introduced by Akerlof 
(1982) and developed in Akerlof & Yellen (1988; 1990).  Fehr et al. (1993) describes a 
laboratory experiment which supports the fair wage-effort hypothesis.  In the one-shot, 
gift-exchange game, subjects do not behave according to strict self interest, rather they 
seem to be concerned with the fairness of the transaction.  The seller’s choice of quality 
(where a higher quality benefits the buyer) is highly correlated with the buyer’s choice of 
price (where a higher price benefits the seller).  The gift-exchange game designed by 
Ernst Fehr and co-authors is the basis for the structure of the exchange in Chapter 2’s 
behavioral model of employee ownership. 
                                                 
 




Benjamin (2005; 2006; 2008) refines the structure of exchange in the model by 
restricting the form of the firm and worker’s profit functions.  That is, particular 
assumptions are made about the rate at which worker utility can be transformed into firm 
profit through effort.  In doing so, Benjamin proves that efficient exchange can result 
from a one time transaction with no enforcement so long as the worker is sufficiently 
fair-minded.  In the 2006 version of his paper, Benjamin attempts to use the model to 
explain profit sharing.9  Benjamin relies on the worker’s compensation as a function of 
his/her own effort (subject to the 1/N problem).  Benjamin’s use of the gift-exchange 
model to explain profit sharing is fundamentally different from the model described in 
Chapter 2.  The model in Chapter 2 explicitly ignores Benjamin’s mechanism, and 
instead allows the worker to take into account that other workers’ compensation will be a 
function of his/her own effort in a firm with profit sharing. 
 Inequity aversion preferences, used in Chapter 2 as the preferences of the worker, 
were first introduce by Fehr & Schmidt (1999).10  The authors justify the proposed 
preferences by explaining subject behavior in a wide variety of experimental scenarios, 
however, critics have found fault with the Fehr-Schmidt utility function.  Most notably, 
Engelmann & Strobel (2004) argue, based on simple distribution experiments, that 
efficiency and maximin concerns explain experimental data better that inequity aversion.  
What is important relative to the Chapter 2 model is that the discrepancies between 
efficiency/maximin and inequity aversion occur entirely in the domain of 
disadvantageous inequality (where the other agent has a higher payoff than the acting 
                                                 
 
9 The section on profit sharing did not appear in the 2005 version and was removed prior to posting the 
2008 version. 
10 Bolton & Ockenfels (2000) offered a similar utility function based on behavior in experimental studies. 
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agent).  Conversely, the action in the gift-exchange model takes place in the domain of 
advantageous inequality (where the acting agent has a higher payoff than the other agent).  
Perhaps most importantly, both maximin and inequity aversion preferences have a kink at 
equality.  That is preferences are non-differentiable at any point where the payoff to the 
two agents are equal.  The behavioral model of employee ownership will utilize 
preferences that reflect both inequity aversion and efficiency/maximin concerns at 
equality and in the domain of advantageous inequality.  The formal model will reflect 
inequity aversion in the domain of disadvantageous inequality, while Section 2.5: 
Extensions of the Model will explore how the model might operate differently if the 
workers preferences reflect efficiency/maximin concerns in the domain of 
disadvantageous inequality. 
 
1.4  In-Group Bias 
What are the factors that affect social preferences?  Loewenstein et al (1989) find 
that subject preferences depend on the framing of a dispute between two parties.  
Subjects preferred distributions that were more generous to the co-disputant when the 
experimenters induced more positive attitudes toward the co-disputant.  Thus it is likely 
that any factor affecting an individual's attitude or disposition toward another will affect 
the individual's regard for the welfare of the other.  The social psychology literature has 
identified several of the forces that affect interpersonal attitudes.  
Homans (1961) finds that humans are attracted to others who share similar values 
to one's self, and hypothesizes that in the absence of specific knowledge of another's 
values, individuals infer similarity of values from similarity of background.  Homans also 
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studied propinquity and found that individuals who were more likely to cross paths also 
were more likely to have positive attitudes toward one another.  It was Zajonc (1968) 
who identified that the ''mere repeated exposure of the individual to a stimulus is a 
sufficient condition for the enhancement of his attitude toward it.''  In Zajonc (1968), 
subjects were repeatedly exposed to pictures of other individuals, and reported a better 
attitude toward pictures they had seen more frequently.11 
In-group bias is used to describe the differential treatment of others based on the 
perception that one is a member of one’s own group and the other is not.  A lengthy 
literature in the 1970’s explores how group identification effects evaluation of others and 
behavioral choices.12  In many of the studies, groups were artificially created in the 
laboratory using something as non-divisive as a coin flip.  This dissertation will treat in-
group bias as the cumulative affect of similarity, exposure and pure group identification 
bias.13  Neither the model in Chapter 2, nor the experiment in Chapter 3, attempt to 
distinguish between the three.  This is justified by the observation that virtually all 
naturally occurring group share the characteristics that group members have more 
exposure to other members than to outsiders and that group members are more similar to 
other members than to outsiders.  Certainly this is true in the case of the group of workers 
in a firm and in the case of the group of students who share an academic major (the 
groups used in the experiment in Chapter 3). 
                                                 
 
11 Other factors that may affect an individual’s attraction/attitude toward another include reciprocal liking, 
physical attractiveness and reinforcement. 
12 See Brewer (1979) for a review of the in-group bias literature. 
13 Brewer (1979) suggests that effects such as similarity act to enhance the salience of in-group/out-group 
distinctions, thereby incorporating affects of similarity into in-group bias. 
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Chapter 2 will model the worker’s utility as a function of the material welfare of 
herself and others given the worker’s attitude toward the others.  A brief introduction to 
the worker’s utility function is given here.  The individual i's utility is a function of the 
material welfare of all persons u = (u1, … , uj, … , uN) given individual i 's attitude toward 
each person ai =(ai1, … , aij, … , aiN). 
Ui = Ui(u; ai) 
In a game involving only two agents, i and j, individual i's utility simplifies to Ui = Ui(ui, 
uj; aij).  Naturally, aij will be higher if agent j is in the same group as agent i (in-group) 
and lower if agent j is an outsider (out-group). 
 
1.5  Gift-Exchange and Dictator Games in Experiments 
 Chapter 3 will present an experiment involving two games, a gift-exchange game 
and a dictator game.  Each of these games has a history in the experimental economics 
literature.  As previously noted, the gift-exchange game was pioneered by Fehr et al. 
(1993) to test the fair wage-effort hypothesis.  Many experiments involving the gift-
exchange game have been published and all find a strong correlation between the actions 
of the first and second mover even though strict self interest predicts no such correlation.  
The experiment described in Chapter 3 closely follows the payoff function used in 
sessions S13-S16 of Fehr et al. (1997).  These sessions involve a pure lump sum transfer 
of wealth (the wage) from the employer to the employee.  Previous gift-exchange 
experiments had wage as a function of effort in the firm’s payoff function, negating the 
possibility that the firm could lose money in the transaction. 
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 The dictator game was originated by Forsythe et al. (1994) in order to distinguish 
between pure preferences for giving and fear of negative reciprocal action in observed 
behavior in the ultimatum bargaining game.  Andreoni & Miller (2002) modified the 
dictator game in order to test for the consistency of other-regarding preferences.  In a 
number of rounds, the authors varied the price of giving (i.e. the rate at which an agent 
can increase another’s profits by decreasing his/her own profits) and found that other-
regarding behavior is quite rational if an agent takes the other individual’s profits into 
his/her own utility function.14  The Andreoni & Miller experimental design is useful in 
the Chapter 3 experiment because t gives a more complete picture of a subject’s 
preferences for giving. 
 
1.6  In-Group Bias in Experimental Economics 
In a range of environments, laboratory subjects display behavior that differs 
greatly from strict self-interest.  These ``social preferences'' allow for efficient outcomes 
in games which lack other means of contract enforcement.  Several studies have 
demonstrated that a subject's regard for the welfare of others can be altered by adjusting 
features of the experiment. 
Bohnet and Frey (1999) provide evidence of the effect of exposure on subject 
preferences in a laboratory setting.  The authors compare giving rates in the dictator game 
across four treatments in which a) the dictator and recipient are anonymous to one 
another, b) the recipient is identified to the dictator, c) the recipient is identified with 
                                                 
 
14 Fisman, Kariv & Markovits (2007) further analyze other-regarding preferences with a similar set of 
budget decisions using a graphical representation of the dictator games. 
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information given, or d) the recipient and dictator are identified to one another.  Bohnet 
and Frey find that dictator giving increases when the exposure of the recipient to the 
dictator is increased.15 
Results from Hannan et al (2002) suggest that in-group bias affects behavior in 
laboratory studies.  The authors compare treatments of the gift-exchange game with 
subjects from two different populations - MBA students and undergraduates.  Smaller 
numbers in MBA programs would suggest that subjects would have more exposure to 
one another.  In addition, more specialized schooling implies more similarity within the 
MBA group than within the undergraduate group.  Therefore, the in-group effect for the 
MBA group should be larger than that of the undergraduate population, predicting higher 
wages and effort levels in the MBA treatment.  In fact higher wage and effort levels were 
observed for the MBA sessions in Hannan et al (2002).16 
 Several studies use artificially created team identity to test for in-group bias in 
economic experiments.17  These studies differ notably from the experiment described in 
Chapter 3 which utilizes naturally occurring groups.  Hamoudi and Thomas (2006) report 
the results of a dictator game that was part of a field study on inter-generational 
exchanges.  The authors compare a treatment where the recipient is a neighbor of the 
dictator and a treatment where the recipient is a stranger from another village.  No in-
group bias is detected; giving rates for neighbors and for strangers are equal. 
                                                 
 
15 On average, dictators offered 26, 35, 52 and 50 percent of the pie in treatments a, b, c and d, respectively.  
Bohnet and Frey characterize these finding as ''the identification effect.'' 
16 There may be other systematic differences between undergrads and MBAs that would causes differences 
in behavior.  Hannan et al (2002) hypothesize that MBAs are more generous because they have more work 
experience. 
17 Eckel & Grossman (2005) find in-group bias in cooperation rates in a public goods game where subjects 
participate in a group task.  Chen & Li (2009) find that subjects are more altruistic toward in-group matches 
across a number of games.  Klor & Shayo (2008) find that in-group bias affects voting on tax regimes. 
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Chapter 2:  A Behavioral Model of Employee Ownership 
2.1  Introduction 
As discussed in Chapter 1, empirical evidence consistently shows a correlation 
between employee ownership and higher productivity.  Theorists have a difficult time 
explaining this relationship due to the 1/N problem.  Purely self-interested agents would 
see so little of the profit from their effort that it is unlikely to affect their behavior.  The 
model presented here supposes that employee-owners are motivated not by the profit that 
they receive from their effort, but by the profit that their co-workers will receive from 
their effort.   
Is a worker more motivated to exert effort when the beneficiary of the effort is her 
co-workers than when the beneficiary is an anonymous shareholder in the firm?  The 
literature on in-group bias suggests that this is likely to be the case.  In-group bias is a 
topic that has yet to get much attention in economics; however, group status may play an 
important role in the field to the extent that it can be manipulated for individual gain, 
mutual gain, or social gain.  A firm can manipulate its ownership structure if it believes 
that it can take advantage of the bias its workers have toward each other.  As I will show 
in Section 2.6, a policymaker may be justified in creating tax breaks for employee owned 
firms if they believe that there are social gains from employee ownership. 
The model laid out in the following sections is a one-shot gift-exchange 
transaction between a profit maximizing employer and a worker with inequity-averse 
preferences.  The key feature of the worker’s preferences is a kink at equality.  That is, 
the worker’s utility function is non-differentiable at any point where the worker’s profit is 
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equal to the firm’s profit.  The justification for the kink at equality is the worker’s 
concern for fairness, a concern that is evident in the majority of laboratory subject in 
economics experiments. 
Several predictions are given for employee owned firms relative to otherwise 
identical private or publicly owned firms.  Employee owned firms will be more 
productive, more profitable and will pay higher wages than their counterparts.  
Employees of employee owned firms will exert more effort and will have higher job 
satisfaction than employees of firms with no employee ownership.  Section 2.2 describes 
the gift-exchange environment and the preferences of the agents in the transaction.  
Section 2.3 solves for the optimal actions of the worker and the firm and presents the 
predictions of the model.  Section 2.4 and 2.5 discuss applications and extensions of the 
model, respectively.  Finally, Section 2.6 provides a discussion of policy implications.  
 
2.2  Set-up and Preferences 
The gift exchange model presented is that proposed by Akerlof (1982) and refined 
by Benjamin (2006).  Worker i has preferences, Ui = Ui(ui, πj; aij), over her own material 
payoff, ui, and the profits of the firm, πj.  The firm is profit-maximizing, or alternatively, 
the controlling owner(s) of the firm is/are purely selfish with Uj = πj. 
The firm offers a wage, w, to the worker.  The worker may choose to accept or 
decline the wage offer.  If she accepts, she then selects an effort level, e.  The game is not 





ui(w,e) = w - ci(e)  πj(w,e) = pj(yi(e)) - w 
 
The functions ci(.), pj(.) and yi(.) are twice differentiable with ci'(.) > 0, ci''(.) > 0, 
pj'(.) > 0, pj''(.) ≤ 0, yi'(.) > 0 and yi''(.) < 0.  The function ci(e) represents the cost of effort 
to the worker, while yi(e) reflects the benefit of effort to firm production.  The function 
pj(.) represents the price of the output good for the firm, taking into account the 
possibility that the firm has market power and therefore increasing productivity may 
decrease the price of the good.  For convenience, I assume the following: lime→-∞c’(e) = 0 
and lime→∞c’(e) = ∞. 
The worker’s preferences take on the inequity aversion form suggested by Fehr 
and Schmidt (1999).  Inequity aversion specifies that Ui is non-differentiable with respect 
to ui and πj at equality, ui = πj.18  In the domain of advantageous inequality, ui > πj, 
individual i regards person j's payoff non-negatively, meaning ∂U/∂πj ≥ 0.  In the domain 
of disadvantageous inequality, ui < πj, individual i regards person j's payoff non-
positively, meaning ∂U/∂πj ≤ 0.  The assumption on preferences in the domain of 
disadvantageous inequality is not supported by efficiency or altruism concerns, which 
would cause person i to regard πj positively in the domain of disadvantageous inequality.  
See figure 2.1 for preferences that satisfy the above assumptions. 
While the norm of equality is straightforward in many contexts, it may not be as 
salient in the worker-firm relationship.  The worker’s concern for equality in this model 
is a stylized way to represent the worker’s concept of a fair transaction with the firm.  
Some would argue that the worker’s concept of fairness with the firm is reference 
                                                 
 
18 Rawlsian preferences justify this assumption as well. 
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dependent, and therefore not static.  In this case, the assumption must be made that the 
worker’s concept of fairness (their line of equality) remains stable across different types 
of firms. 
Preferences are assumed to be convex, where differentiable, and homothetic.  The 
homothetic assumption is included to ensure that -(∂U/∂ui)/(∂U/∂πj) is non-decreasing as 
payoffs increase along the line of equality ui = πj.  Lastly, I will assume that the single-
crossing property holds for attitude in the domain of advantageous inequality.19  That is  
 
(∂2U/∂ui∂aij)/(∂2U/∂πj∂aij) < 1 for all (ui, πj) such that ui > πj. 
 
Figure 2.2 demonstrates how preferences change as aij changes.  After solving the 
worker’s maximization problem, I will compare the equilibrium contract, (w,e), between 
worker i and firm j = 1 with the contract between worker i and firm j = 2, where firms 1 
and 2 differ only aij.  Specifically, the worker’s attitude toward her employer when 
working for firm 2 is greater than his/her attitude toward her employer when working for 
firm 1, ai2 > ai1. 
 
2.3  Solving the Gift-Exchange Game 
The two-stage gift-exchange game is easily solved by backward induction.  We 
begin by considering the worker’s effort decision after a wage offer has been made by the 
                                                 
 
19 Evidence from Chapter 1 and Loewenstein et al (1989) suggests that the same property does not hold in 
the domain of disadvantageous inequality.  Furthermore, no assumption on the effect of attitude on 
preferences in the domain of disadvantageous inequality is needed for this model. 
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firm. Given the wage offer, the worker is faced with the following maximization 
problem. 
 
maxe Ui = Ui(ui, πj; aij) 
s.t. ui(w,e) = w - ci(e) 
and πj(w,e) = pj(yi(e)) – w 
 
Define mij(.) = pj(yi(ci-1(.))).  The maximization conditions simplify to: 
 
πj(w,e) = mij(w - ui) – w 
 
Given the assumptions on ci(.), pj(.) and yi(.) from the previous section, this function is 
decreasing and concave.  The wage curve shifts down and to the right as wage increase.  
See figure 2.3. 
 Consider the worker’s utility maximization problem for different wage levels.  At 
low wages, the worker will choose an effort level such that ui = πj.  This corner solution 
will prevail as long as -(∂U/∂ui)/(∂U/∂uj) ≥ mij’(w - ui) at ui = πj.  That is, the worker’s 
marginal rate of substitution from πj to ui is less than the rate at which the worker can 
actually trade firm profit for her material payoff.  The worker does not exert more effort 
because doing so would put her in the domain of disadvantageous inequality.  As wage 
increases, the function πj(w,e) = mij(w - ui) – w crosses ui = πj at higher levels of effort 
and therefore lower levels of mij’(w - ui).  Meanwhile, the worker’s marginal rate of 
substitution, (∂U/∂ui)/(∂U/∂uj), is constant along ui = πj, due to the assumption of 
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homotheticity.  If wage is increased sufficiently such that -(∂U/∂ui)/(∂U/∂uj) < mij’(w - ui) 
at ui = πj, an interior solution will prevail with the standard tangency condition, -
(∂U/∂ui)/(∂U/∂uj) = mij’(w - ui) at the effort level chosen by the worker.  See figure 2.4 for 
an example of a wage-effort path for a given set of worker preferences and mij(.). 
 The firm’s wage decision follows easily from the worker’s maximization problem 
discussed above.  The firm chooses the wage that will result in the maximum profit, 
given the preferences of the worker.  See, for example, the profit maximizing wage offer 
highlighted in figure 2.4.  
 The following paragraphs consider how the worker’s effort decision changes 
when her attitude toward the firm changes and how the firm’s wage offer changes in 
anticipation of the worker’s behavior.  Under standard microeconomic preferences an 
increase in the worker’s attitude toward the firm would cause an increase in the worker’s 
effort.  However, inequity aversion preferences create a boundary which the worker does 
not want to cross.  The firm can move the worker away from the boundary, and allow for 
more effort, by offering the worker a higher wage.   Both the worker and the firm benefit 
from the worker’s improved attitude toward the firm creating an efficiency gain.  
However, there is a limit to the efficiency gains from raising the worker's attitude toward 
the firm, highlighted by Definition 1 and Lemma 1, below.  The exact limit depends on 
ci(.), pj(.) and yi(.), which determine the rate at which the worker (through the exertion of 
effort) can transform her own material payoff into profit for the firm.20 
                                                 
 
20 The first derivatives of ci(.), pj(.) and yi(.) have rather intuitive interpretations.  The rate that effort 
transforms into profit, yi'(.), is high for high ability workers.  The rate that effort reduces the material payoff 
of the worker, ci'(.) is low for workers who enjoy their jobs.  The term, pj'(.) is high for firms that are able to 
better capitalize on the production of their workers, due to better technology or more market power.  Within 




Definition 1.  Given mij(.), let the Rawsian wage, w*, be the wage that the profit 
maximizing firm offers to a worker with pure Rawlsian preferences, Ui = min(ui, πj). 
 
Lemma 1.  Given mij(.) and Ui(ui, πj; aij), there exists an ai*, such that for any aij ≥ ai*, 
the profit maximizing firm will offer the worker the Rawlsian wage, w = w*, and for any 
aij < ai*, the firm will offer the worker a wage strictly less than the Rawlsian wage, w < 
w*.21 
 
For a graphic depiction of Definition 1 and Lemma 1 see Figure 2.5. 22 
Theorem 1 will be the basis for making comparisons between firms with different 
corporate structures.  Let wij be the optimal wage offer for firm j to make to worker i.  Let 
eij(w) describe the utility maximizing effort level for worker i for a given wage offer 
received from firm j.  Let eij = eij(wij) be the equilibrium effort level for the worker in a 
contract with firm j.  Let πij = πij(wij, eij) be the profits of firm j from a contract with 
worker i at the equilibrium effort and wage levels.  And let uij = u(wij, eij) be the material 
payoff of worker i from a contract with firm j at the equilibrium effort and wage levels. 
 
Theorem 1.  Suppose that the worker's preferences satisfy the standard assumptions of 
completeness, transitivity and continuity.  Suppose that in the domain of advantageous 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
profitable firms receive higher wage offers in equilibrium.  Together, mij(.) = pj(yi(ci-1(.))) determines the 
possible gains from trade between the firm and the worker, incorporating both firm and worker 
characteristics. 
21 See Appendix 2.1 for proofs. 
22 Benjamin(2006) shows that for a sufficient aij, a fully efficient allocation (ui, πj) will be achieved. 
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inequality the worker regards πj positively and preferences are homothetic, quasi-convex 
and satisfy the single-crossing property, and in the domain of disadvantageous 
inequality, the worker regards πj non-positively.  Finally, suppose that 0 < ai1 < ai* and 
ai1 < ai2.  Then, 
 
1.   wi2  > wi1 
2.  (a) For all w > wi1, ei2(w) > ei1(w) 
     (b) For all w ≤ wi1, ei2(w) = ei1(w) 
3.  ei2 > ei1 
4.  πi2 > πi1 
5.  ui2 > ui1 
6.  U(ui2, πi2; ai2) > U(ui1, πi1; ai1) 
 
For a graphic depiction of Theorem 1, see Figure 2.6.  Notice that in item 1, the worker 
does not give a higher effort level in firm 2 at low wage levels, w ≤ wi1. 
 
2.4  Applications 
What comparisons can be made using Theorem 1?  Before applying the theory to 
employee ownership we must deal with the fact that the firms we are considering are 
owned by multiple shareholders rather than one individual.  Because the worker is 
making only one effort decision and the material welfare of all of the shareholders are 
affected, we will assume that the worker considers the collective welfare of the 
shareholders rather than the welfare of the shareholders individually.  I will also assume 
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that the worker's attitude toward the firm is the weighted sum of the worker's attitude 
toward the shareholders. 
 
Employee Ownership vs. Conventional Ownership 
Consider a firm that is fully employee owned and a firm that has no employee 
ownership.  As long as aiCOF < a*, a likely proposition, Theorem 1 applies.  The 
employee owned firm is more profitable and pays higher wages than the otherwise 
identical publicly owned firm. 
 
Large vs. Small Employee Owned Firms 
Consider a small, 100% employee owned firm with n > 0 workers and a large, 
100% employee owned firm with m*n workers.  Suppose that the large firm is divided 
into m > 1 offices, with each office identical in size, n, to the small firm, and there is 
minimal personnel interaction between the offices.  Exposure is greater between persons i 
and j who work in the same office than between persons i and j who work in different 
offices.  The average exposure level to fellow employees is smaller in the large firm.  
Due to greater average exposure to coworkers, ain > ai,m*n, where ain is the value of person 
i's attitude toward a 100% employee owned firm of size n, and ai,m*n is the value of 
person i's attitude toward a 100% employee owned firm of size m*n.  Consider a third 
100% employee owned firm with p*n workers, where 1 < p < m, and the firm is divided 
into p offices, each with n workers.  Again due to greater average exposure to coworkers, 
we have aip*n > ai,m*n.  Does increasing the size of the firm dampen the benefit of 
employee ownership?  If ai,m*n < a* then yes, the firm loses some of the benefit of 
employee ownership as size increases.  The firm faces a tradeoff between the advantages 
of growth and the disadvantages of reduced employee effort.  If, however, ain < a*, then 
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the firm will be able to grow, at least up to some level, without losing the productivity 
advantages of employee ownership. 
 
Partial Employee Ownership 
Let qj be the fraction of the stock, 0 ≤ qj ≤ 1, in firm j that is owned by the 
employees of that firm.23  Consider two partially employee owned firms where, q2 > q1.  
Due to greater average similarity and exposure to shareholders we would expect the 
attitude of the firm 2’s workers toward the firm will be greater than the attitude of firm 
1’s workers toward the firm, ai2 > ai1.  As long as aij < a*, the firm can increase 
productivity by increasing the number of shares owned by the workers.  However, it 
might be costly for the firm to maintain a high level of employee ownership.24  If so, the 
firm faces a tradeoff between the increased productivity from employee ownership and 
the cost of maintaining that ownership structure.25 
 
Family Ownership 
Similar results apply to family owned businesses.  The model predicts that 
productivity will decrease as a result of a family business going public.  This model may 
help to explain some of the struggles of businesses that were previously family owned. 
 
                                                 
 
23 Of course, the fully employee owned firm (q=1) and the conventionally owned firm (q=0) are the 
extremes. 
24 For example, Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC) was the third largest by revenues, 
100% employee owned firm in the US until October 2006, when they held a public offering of shares 
totaling $1.245 billion.  In their SEC filings, SAIC officials stated that, ``The principal purpose of this 
offering is to better enable us to use our cash and cash flows from operations to fund organic growth and 
growth through acquisitions, as well as to provide us with publicly traded stock that can be used for future 
acquisitions. Creating a public market for our common stock will ultimately eliminate our use of cash to 
provide liquidity to our stockholders by repurchasing their shares in the limited market or in other 
transactions.'' 
25 According to the National Center for employee Ownership, the median percentage ownership for ESOPs 
in privately owned firms is between 30 and 40%. 
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2.5  Extensions of the Model 
There are several ways in which the behavioral model of employee ownership 
may be enriched.  The first two extensions discussed relate to the robustness of the 
model.  In particular, how robust is the model with regard to the preference structure 
given to the worker?  And how robust is the model with regard to the firm’s knowledge 
of worker preferences?  The third extension relates to the emphasis of “corporate culture” 
in the employee ownership literature.  Can the model be expanded to explain the 
importance of corporate culture to the productivity of employee owned firms? 
The model laid out in this chapter relies on worker preferences that have a kink at 
equality and feature a negative regard for firm profits in the domain of disadvantageous 
inequality.  How would the predictions of the model change if these assumptions were 
relaxed?  Consider a worker who has a positive regard for the firm in the domain of 
disadvantageous inequality, but retains a kink at equality.  In other words, the worker 
continues to be willing to trade his/her own material payoff for firm profits in the domain 
of disadvantageous inequality, but not at the same rate at which he/she makes the trade in 
the domain of advantageous inequality.  In this case, Theorem 1 may be applied as long 
as the following condition holds true:  
 
-(∂U/∂ui)/(∂U/∂πj) ≤ mij’(w - ui) for all (ui, πj) such that ui = πj, 
 
where -(∂U/∂ui)/(∂U/∂πj) is the slope of the worker’s preferences approaching from above 
the line of equality.  If this condition does not hold, then there will exist wage levels such 
that the worker will choose an effort level that generates (ui, πj) such that πj > ui.  When 
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this occurs, the firm no longer has an incentive to raise its wage in order to generate more 
effort from the workers.  Another way to look at it is that the worker is not punishing the 
firm for offering a low wage. 
In the model described previously in this chapter, the firm knows the preferences 
of the worker.  How would the firm’s decision change if there is uncertainty in the 
worker’s preferences?  What about a firm that is constrained to offer the same wage to all 
of its workers?  How would firm’s wage offer change if a small fraction of its workers 
displayed selfish rather than inequity averse preferences. 
A third extension of the model could help explain the importance of corporate 
culture in employee owned firms.  It could be argued that corporate culture affects the 
salience of the distinction between in-group workers and out-group non-employee 
shareholders.  This could create a greater effect of employee ownership when the 
ownership culture is emphasized.  While this argument is certainly valid, a model where 
workers make effort decisions simultaneously may shed more light on the importance of 
corporate ownership.  Consider that the worker’s concern for fairness may take into 
account not only the wage offer of the firm, but also the effort level of other workers.  
Others workers shirking reduces the total compensation of the worker.  In the model 
described above, one can view other workers shirking as taking away some material 
payoff from the worker, shifting his/her wage offer (or total compensation) curve to the 
left.  The worker would respond with a reduction in his/her own effort.  The model would 
generate dual equilibria: a) all workers give optimal effort according to their preferences 
(as in Figure 2.6) and b) all workers give zero effort destroying the benefits of employee 
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ownership.  A positive corporate culture that promotes hard work on the behalf of others 
would help steer the firm toward the optimal effort equilibrium. 
 
2.6  Discussion 
Employee stock ownership plans (ESOPs) in the United States, and similar plans 
worldwide, are a hot topic for debate because firms that use these plans receive 
significant tax breaks from the federal government.  The model presented here 
contributes to the debate by providing appealing predictions that are not driven by the 
worker as a residual claimant.  The model achieves both of the following: 1) it overcomes 
the 1/N problem, and 2) the driving force behind the model is in harmony with antidotal 
evidence on employee ownership. 
So why have more firms not voluntarily adopted employee ownership?  Becker 
(2007) writes that if ``employee ownership is said to induce employees to work harder... 
owners would not need a tax advantage to create a sizable employee ownership since they 
would subsidize stock ownership by employees in order to improve productivity.''  The 
behavioral model of ownership structure brings a new element to this debate.  Consider 
the possible transaction of an owner selling/giving a number of shares of the firm to 
worker X.  The social benefit of worker X's stock ownership is derived from the 
increased productivity of other workers in the firm.  However, only a fraction of the 
increased revenue goes to the firm as profits.  The remaining fraction of the revenue goes 
to other workers in the form of higher wages.26  Therefore, only part of the total social 
                                                 
 
26 The firm must pay higher wages because according to the model, higher productivity does not happen 
automatically.  A worker will increase her effort only after the firm has increased her wage. 
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benefit of worker X's stock ownership is enjoyed by those involved in the transaction.  
The other portion of the social benefit is an externality enjoyed by the other workers in 
the firm.  This externality forces a wedge between the Pareto optimal level of stock 
ownership by worker X and the socially optimal level of stock ownership.  Market failure 
will occur when there is a social benefit to employee ownership, but the firm’s benefit of 
is smaller than the difference between the market value of firm stock and the employee’s 
value of firm stock.  Clearly, no market failure would exist if the firm’s benefit of 
employee ownership is so large that it would gain by giving stock to its employees at a 
price of zero.  Thus, if the government deems that one of its functions is to promote 
socially efficient outcomes, and believes that there is a market failure as described above, 
then it is justified in providing tax incentives for employee ownership. 
One might argue that if an externality wedge is preventing an agreement that 
reaches the socially efficient outcome, then the workers’ union should be able to 
negotiate a price at which workers would purchase shares from the firm.  After all, the 
entirety of the social benefit is enjoyed by the aggregate of the workers and the owners of 
the firm.  However, there are two reasons why the union would be unlikely to accept this 
deal.  First, some firms may not have unions if workers are unable to organize for various 
reasons.  Second, and more importantly, the deal would necessarily involve a mandate 
that workers purchase a certain quantity of stock at a particular price.  Furthermore, the 
price would be below the worker's value of the stock.  This plan would seem to be a hard 
sell to the workers despite the benefits that all parties would enjoy in the end. 
The general equilibrium consequences of the employee ownership model 
presented here are ambiguous with respect to employment.  Classic efficiency wage 
 
 25
models predict equilibrium unemployment as a result of increasing wages.27  While the 
employee ownership model considered here also involves “above equilibrium” wages, 
the above equilibrium portion of the statement refers to an economy of non-employee 
owned firms.  The shift to employee ownership increases the productivity of the workers.  
In the standard supply and demand model, where the firm’s demand curve reflects the 
marginal revenue productivity of its workers, employee ownership causes an outward 
shift in demand.  The increase in demand may or may not fully offset the wage increase 
in terms of whether or not full employment is reached. 
Let’s also consider how paying above equilibrium wages might affect employee 
owned firms in a mixed economy with both employee-owned and non-employee-owned 
firms.  In this case, the employee owned firms would have first pick of workers, and 
would hire those workers who are inherently most productive (e.g. due to ability).  
Therefore, any observed effect of employee ownership on productivity in a mixed 
economy would include both the pure employee ownership effect and the effect of higher 
wages through attracting better workers. 
The next chapter examines experimental evidence on the behavioral model of 
employee ownership.  In particular, the assumptions on worker preferences in an in-group 
environment will be tested against subject behavior in an out-group environment.  
Further, the experiment will test subject behavior in a gift-exchange game that mirrors the 
model described above.  Observed behavior of workers in the in-group and out-group 
environments will be compared to the predictions of the model. 
                                                 
 
27 See Shapiro & Stiglitz (1984). 
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Chapter 3:  A Laboratory Experiment on In-Group Bias in Trusting 
Behavior and Preferences for Giving 
 
3.1  Introduction 
Would you trust a stranger on the street as much as your own brother or sister?  
Who would you be more likely to help in a time of need?  For most people, the answers 
to these questions are obvious, yet, economic theories of other-regarding (social) 
behavior fail to consider the relationship between the individual an the “other.”28  The 
extent to which the relationship between agents may affect economic outcomes is 
unknown – in fact, it is the goal of this paper to shed some light on this unknown.  
However, the potential for relationships to have real economic consequences occurs any 
time behavioral motives (fairness, altruism, etc.) influence an agent’s decision making.  
Consider the labor relationship.  It is well known that family-owned businesses 
struggle when they move away from the family-ownership model.  Perhaps the change in 
the relationship between employees and owner affects the productivity of the workers.  
Similarly, should employee-owned firms be viewed differently from firms with 
conventional ownership structures?  Surely, the relationship between employees and 
owners is different.  Team performance based pay schemes, such as team bonuses, allow 
the benefit of a worker’s effort to go to fellow team members rather than unknown 
owners of the firm.  Do these schemes utilize the relationship between team members to 
improve economic outcomes, namely the productivity of the firm? 
                                                 
 
28 For theories of other-regarding behavior see Rabin (1993), Fehr and Schmidt (1999), Bolton and 
Ockenfels (2000), Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004), and Cox et. al. (2007). 
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There are two primary reasons to test the Chapter 2 model using experimental 
rather than naturally occurring data.  First, empirical tests of the effects of employee 
ownership are subject to endogeneity problems.  As discussed in Chapter 1, firms 
differentially select into employee ownership plans, often as part of a larger restructuring 
effort.  Second, there are general equilibrium effects on the productivity of employee-
owned firms in an economy with both employee-owned and non-employee-owned firms.  
By paying higher wages, employee-owned firms attract better workers and increase 
productivity.  Yet, this increase in productivity is not inherent in employee ownership.  
An experiment allows for a test of the employee ownership model in a vacuum, free from 
endogeneity and general equilibrium concerns.   
The experiment reported below reveals that the impact of relationships on 
decision making is more complex than might be expected.  Perhaps one’s prior might be 
that individuals are willing to give more to members of their own group than to outsiders.  
I find in-group bias in giving behavior, but only when the price of giving was high – that 
is, when the gift from player 1 was multiplied by a number less than one before it was 
received by player 2.29  When the price of giving was one (no multiplier) there was some 
evidence of in-group bias, and there was no evidence of in-group bias when the price of 
giving was lower than one.  Together these results suggest that individuals place more 
importance on equality within their group than with outsiders. 
In-group bias was observed in trusting behavior, but not reciprocal behavior.  
These results together are particularly surprising because a lack of in-group bias in 
                                                 
 
29 In-group bias means that individuals favor members of their own group over outsiders.  In-group bias as 




reciprocal behavior implies that subjects were not justified in trusting their own group 
members more than outsiders.  In other words, group members were more trusting of 
each other than of outsiders, but they were not more trustworthy toward each other than 
toward outsiders. 
One difficulty in testing for in-group bias is attempting to also satisfy the desire 
for anonymity among subjects.  Experimental economists often insist on anonymity in 
order to avoid confounding explanations for behavior such as the anticipation of future 
reciprocal action outside the laboratory.  I address the issue of in-group bias while 
maintaining anonymity, by recruiting subjects into treatments based on pre-existing 
groups.  Subjects in the experiment did not know the identity of the other person who was 
affected by their decision, but knew that that person was one of the other subjects in the 
laboratory.  Groups were used in order to keep relatively constant the relationship 
between any two subjects in the session.  Treatment 1 consisted of two sessions involving 
subjects recruited exclusively from the Hearing and Speech Sciences department and the 
Physics department, respectively, while treatment 2 consisted of three sessions involving 
subjects recruited from a variety of departments.   Undergraduate majors were chosen as 
groups for the experiment for two reasons.  First, because relationships among members 
are relatively innocuous compared to other groups such as family groups, ethnic groups 
and religious groups, any results found in this experiment could arguably be viewed as a 
“lower-bound” on in-group bias.  Second, sorting into majors occurs based on academic 
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interest and not based on preferences for other group members.30  Therefore, reverse 
causality will not be an issue in interpreting the results. 
 
3.2  Literature 
  Several recent papers have explored the effects of group membership and 
identity in economic games.  Eckel and Grossman (2005) create team identity in the 
laboratory by having subjects participate in a group task.  When subjects are then asked 
to play a repeated public goods game, the authors find that artificially created team 
identity increases cooperation.  Chen and Li (2009) also utilize an artificially created 
team identity design.  Across a number of games, they find that subjects are more 
altruistic toward an in-group match than toward an out-group match.  Chen and Li 
provide a thorough review of the social identity literature in the fields of social 
psychology and experimental economics.  Klor and Shayo (2008) study how social 
identity influences preferences for redistribution in a game where subjects vote on a tax 
regime.  Subjects in the experiment tended to vote for regimes that benefited their group 
the most whether or not it was optimal for the individual subject.  As part of a larger 
study on inter-generational exchanges, Hamoudi and Thomas (2006) conduct a dictator 
game with participants in Mexico.  The authors find that subjects are equally generous 
toward strangers as they are toward neighbors. 
 
                                                 
 




3.3  Experimental Design 
The experiment reported here was conducted in five sessions at the University of 
Maryland in February of 2008.  Undergraduate subjects were recruited from the Hearing 
and Speech Sciences department and the Physics department for sessions 1 and 2, 
respectively, and were recruited from various departments for sessions 3, 4 and 5.  
Subjects were informed during recruitment that sessions 1 and 2 were restricted to 
undergraduate Hearing and Speech and Physics (HESP) majors, respectively, and 
sessions 3-5 were open to all undergraduates at the University of Maryland.  Session 1 
consisted of 15 subjects, while sessions 2-5 held 20 subjects.  No more than five subjects 
from a single undergraduate major participated in a particular session of the out-group 
treatment (sessions 3-5).  Notably, all of the subjects in session 1 (HESP majors) were 
female, while 17 out of 20 subjects in session 2 (physics majors) were male.  Sessions 3-5 
each contained between eight and ten females.  Other individual characteristics were 
similar across treatment and majors.  See Table 3.1 for details of the subject pool 
composition. 
The experimental design utilizes pre-existing, rather than artificially constructed, 
groups to test for in-group bias in preferences for giving and trusting behavior.31  
Procedures and instructions in the laboratory were identical across all sessions with a few 
minor exceptions to accommodate an odd number of subjects in session 1.  Full 
instructions are given in the appendix. 
                                                 
 
31 To some extent a “group” is constructed when subjects are brought together in an experimental 
laboratory and asked to participate in a common task.  Any group effect that was created in the laboratory 
is presumed to be identical across treatments and therefore should not affect the results of the experiment. 
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In each session, subjects participated in two games, the first of which was a 
modified dictator game introduced by Andeoni and Miller (2002).  The modified dictator 
game was chosen because it directly measures an individual’s preferences for giving. 
Subjects were presented a menu of linear budget sets, πs + pπo = m, which varied in 
endowment, m, and the price of giving, p, and where πs and πo are the monetary payoff to 
one’s self and an other subject, respectively.  The set of choice problems presented to 
subjects allows for the possibility that in-group bias affects preferences for giving 
differentially across different value of p.  Additionally, Andreoni and Miller (2002) were 
able to identify three clusters of individual preferences, selfish, Leontief and perfect 
substitutes, which will be defined later.  To the extent that an individual’s giving behavior 
may be characterized by different utility functions under different circumstances 
(different “others”), the experimental design permits an examination of in-group bias in 
the formation of preference structures. 
Upon entering the laboratory subjects were seated at computer stations with 
screen guards and were asked to remain quiet during the experiment.32  Instructions were 
read aloud by the experimenter while subject read along on their monitors.  In random 
order, subjects were presented eleven allocation choices listed in Table 3.2.  An example 
of a decision screen is given in Figure 3.1a.  In the example, tokens held are worth 1 
point and tokens passed are worth 2 points.  After the allocation choice was entered, 
subjects were presented the outcome of their decision, as in Figure 3.1b.  The subject has 
chosen to hold 50 tokens and pass 10 tokens.  The subject earns 50 * 1 = 50 points for the 
                                                 
 
32 The experiment was programmed and conducted with the software z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007). 
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round, and the recipient earns 10 * 2 = 20 points.  Points were converted to dollar 
earnings as a rate of $0.06 per point.33 
After all subjects had made their decisions, subjects were randomly paired and 
one decision from each pair was randomly chosen to be executed.34  The results from the 
modified dictator game were not presented to the subjects until the conclusion of the 
session.  Therefore, subjects did not learn of their profits in the first game, until after they 
participated in the gift-exchange game. 
The gift-exchange game reveals both trusting and reciprocal preferences.  The 
action of the first player indicates their level of trust in the other player, and the action of 
the second player indicates their desire to reciprocate a positive or negative act.  The 
profit functions of the gift-exchange game involved a pure lump-sum price transfer 
similar in spirit to sessions S13-S16 of Fehr et al (1997): 
u = p – c 
π = q(c) – p 
Lower case u is the payoff of the seller which is determined by price, p, chosen by the 
buyer and cost, c, chosen by the seller.35  The profits of the buyer, π, are defined by a 
commonly known, concave function of cost, q(c), and price, p.  The buyer chooses price 
first and the seller chooses cost after observing the price offer of the buyer.  The choice of 
price across treatments will constitute a test for in-group bias in the trust of buyers.  
                                                 
 
33 Five tasks of a different nature were presented to subjects following the 11 rounds described above.  
Results from the additional tasks do not appear in this paper. 
34 This procedure differs from previous experiments.  In Andreoni and Miller (2002) each subject was both 
a dictator and a recipient, whereas in this experiment a subject was either a dictator or a recipient. 
35 Traditionally, the gift-exchange game is presented as an employer-employee interaction in the literature 
while presented as a buyer-seller interaction in the laboratory.  For simplicity, I present the game as a 
buyer-seller interaction here as in the lab. 
 
 33
Likewise, the cost response function of sellers, c(p), will allow for the observation of in-
group bias in reciprocal behavior. 
During the instructions to the gift-exchange game, subjects were randomly 
selected to be either a buyer or seller.  The game was presented to the subjects as a three 
step procedure in which the seller sells a good to the buyer.  In stage 1, the buyer chose 
an integer price between 0 and 25, inclusive, see Figure 3.2a.  In stage 2, the price was 
displayed to the seller and then the seller chose an integer cost between 0 and 20, 
inclusive, see Figure 3.2b.  The cost chosen determined the quality of the good according 
to a discrete approximation of the function q(c) = 50 – 250/(c+5), presented to the 
subjects in table form.36  In stage 3, the price, cost and quality were displayed to both the 
buyer and the seller along with the buyer’s profit and the seller’s profit; see Figures 3.2c 
and 3.2d. 
In the example given in figure 3.2, the buyer chose a price of 12 and the seller 
chose a cost of 3.  The cost of 3 translated into a quality of 18.8.  Therefore, the seller 
earned 12 – 3 = 9 points in the round, while the buyer earned 18.8 – 12 = 6.8 points.  
Suppose instead that the seller had chosen a cost of 0.  A cost of 0 translates into a quality 
of 0, which would result in a profit of 0 – 12 = -12 points for the buyer.  Thus, the buyer 
is displaying trust in the seller when choosing a high price. 
The game was repeated ten times in sessions 2-5 and eight times in session 1.  A 
subject maintained the same role (buyer or seller) for all rounds and was never paired 
with the same subject twice.  All pairings were anonymous. 
                                                 
 
36 See Figure 3.2 for the cost-quality table presented to the subjects. 
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 At the end of the scheduled number of rounds, one round was randomly selected 
to be executed.  Points earned in the selected round were worth $0.30.  Subjects were 
informed during the instructions for the gift-exchange game that they would receive a 
show-up fee of $18.00 for participating in the experiment, but that it was possible to 
make negative profits in the gift-exchange game.  In the case of negative profits, that 
value was subtracted from the subject’s show-up fee.  Sessions lasted between 80 and 90 
minutes and subjects earned between $14.10 and $31.20 in the experiment, with average 
earnings of $21.90. 
 The session concluded with a questionnaire which asked for personal information 
about the subject, as well as information about the subject’s familiarity with, friendliness 
with, and attitude toward the other subjects in the session. 
 
Groups 
 University students are likely to identify as both a member of the university in 
which they attend, and a member of the undergraduate population of the department in 
which they major.  If students have an in-group bias toward each group, then the results 
of this experiment measure the difference between the physics (HESP) students’ in-group 
bias toward other physics (HESP) students and their in-group bias toward other 
University of Maryland students in general.  We would expect the undergraduate major 
bias to be larger than the university bias due to higher levels of similarity and exposure 
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within undergraduate majors and possibly a greater sense of group identity within majors 
as well.37 
According to the University of Maryland, there were 240 undergraduate physics 
majors and 151 undergraduate HESP majors registered during the Spring 2008 semester 
compared with 25,370 total undergraduates.38  In-group subjects are likely to be more 
similar to one another than out-group subjects due to their shared academic and career 
interests.  In-groups subjects were also more similar to one another in terms of gender 
(see Table 3.1).  Questionnaire data show that in-group subjects were more familiar with 
their fellow session participants than the out-group subjects.  Participants in the in-group 
(out-group) treatment reported that, on average, approximately 10 (2) of the other 19 
subjects in their session were at least “vaguely familiar” to them.39  The difference in 
reported other-subject familiarity between the treatments is statistically significant at the 
1% level. 
Loewenstein et. al. (1989) reveals a link between an individual's attitude toward 
another and the individual's regard for the other’s well-being.  This paper does not 
directly address the mode through which group membership biases preferences for giving 
and trusting behavior, however, data are consistent with attitude as a possible avenue.  On 
average, subjects in the in-group (out-group) treatment described their attitude toward 
approximately 6 (2) of the other 19 subjects in their session as at least “somewhat 
                                                 
 
37 The degree to which subjects identify themselves as a University of Maryland undergraduate or a physics 
or HESP major was not addressed in the questionnaire. 
38 This data is publicly available through the University of Maryland’s Institutional Research Planning & 
Assessment at https://www.irpa.umd.edu/Enroll/ebm-200801.pdf. 
39 The familiarity data is reported after normalizing the responses of session 1 subjects to reflect a session 
involving 20 subjects (rather than 15). 
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positive.”40  The difference in reported attitude toward other subjects between the 
treatments is statistically significant at the 1% level. 
 
3.4  Predictions 
This section lays out the experimental predictions generated by the model in 
chapter 2.  First, the model assumes the single crossing property; that in-group agents will 
have preferences in favor of the other agent relative to out-group agents in the domain of 
advantageous inequality.  In the modified dictator game, this means that the in-group 
subjects will pass more tokens than out-group subjects, particularly when the price of 
giving is high.  A subject who values equality will pass more tokens when the price of 
giving is high.  Therefore, the difference between the selfish action and the “fair” 
(equality-seeking) action is largest when the price of giving is high.  
 
Prediction 1:  In-group subjects will pass more tokens in the dictator game, particularly 
in rounds where the price of giving is high. 
 
Chapter 2 models a game involving a profit maximizing firm and an inequity 
averse worker, whereas the experiment described here involves only laboratory subjects, 
who routinely display behavior that is inconsistent will revenue maximization.  
Therefore, the predictions tested here will all concern the behavior of the employee/seller, 
                                                 
 
40 As with the familiarity data, the attitudinal data is reported after normalizing the responses of session 1 
subjects to reflect a session involving 20 subjects. 
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and not the behavior of the buyer.41  Still, we can ask what a profit maximizing firm 
would do given the actions of the employees/sellers.  All of the following predictions 
come from Theorem 1 of Chapter 2 and are tied together because all relate to the choice 
of the seller. 
 
Prediction 2:  At all prices above some threshold price level, sellers in the in-group 
treatment will choose a higher cost for a given wage than sellers in the out-group 
treatment, on average. 
Prediction 3:  Given the behavior of the sellers, the profit maximizing price level will be 
higher for buyers in the in-group treatment than buyers in the out-group treatment. 
Prediction 4:  The cost level chosen by in-group sellers who receive the in-group profit 
maximizing price will be higher, on average, than the cost level chosen by out-group 
sellers who receive the out-group profit maximizing price. 
Prediction 5:  The profits of a buyer who offers the in-group profit maximizing price to 
in-group sellers will be higher, on average, than the profits of a buyer who offers the out-
group profit maximizing price to out-group sellers. 
Prediction 6:  The profits (material payoff) of an in-group seller who receives the in-
group profit maximizing price will be higher, on average, that the profits of an out-group 
seller who receives the out-group profit maximizing price. 
 
Note that if Prediction 2 fails, then Predictions 3-6 are likely to fail as well.  Also 
regarding Prediction 2, we should expect to see that, at all price below the threshold price 
                                                 
 
41 The behavior of the in-group and out-group buyers in the experiment will be analyzed in the following 
section, notwithstanding the absence of buyer behavior predictions generated from the Chapter 2 model. 
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level, both the in-group sellers and the out-group sellers give the Rawlsian predicted cost 
level. The Rawlsian predicted cost level is the choice that comes closest to equalizing the 
payoffs for the buyer and seller. 
 
3.5  Results 
This section presents tests for in-groups bias in five distinct outcomes: giving in 
standard dictator game (price of giving is 1); giving across all dictator games; individual 
preference types; trusting behavior in the gift-exchange game; and reciprocal behavior in 
the gift-exchange game. 
 
Giving in Standard Dictator Games 
In the standard dictator games, subjects gave away, on average 33.2% of their 
tokens.  This number is considerably high relative to previous studies where the average 
fraction of the pie given to others is typically between 20% and 25%.  A breakdown of 
subject generosity by treatment and area of study at the bottom of Table 3.1 sheds light 
on the discrepancy.  Science and humanities majors have been grouped for two reasons.  
First, there were only seven subjects with humanities majors in the experiment, and 
second the giving rates of science and humanities majors are similar (36.9% and 35.4%, 
respectively, in games where the price of giving is 1).  Notice that out-group subjects 
majoring in the social sciences are the only group to display a giving rate, 24.6%, that is 
similar to previous studies. 
A t-test shows that the difference in means between the in-group fraction tokens 
passed (37.4%) and out-group fraction tokens passed (30.8%) is not statistically 
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significant (p = 0.11).  Table 3.3 presents a linear regression on tokens passed controlling 
for endowment.  The treatment effect is not statistically significant.  The difference in 
giving rates between social science and non-social science majors is large (7-8 tokens) 
and statistically significant (at the 5% level before controlling for gender and 10% level 
after controlling for gender).42  Because there were no male, Hearing and Speech majors 
in Session 1, the in-group effect in Table 3.3 is identified by social science females, non-
social science females, and non-social science males, but not by social science males.43 
To give a better sense of the differences between in-group and out-group giving, 
Figure 3.3 presents the cumulative distribution of the average fraction of tokens passed 
by treatment from the three allocation choices where the price of giving is one.  A 
Wilcoxin rank-sum test does not reject the hypothesis that the in-group and out-group 
choices came from the same underlying distribution (p = 0.28).  Both the in-group and 
out-group distributions have a focal point at 50%, a common finding for the dictator 
game.  Approximately 38% of subjects in each treatment gave away half of their tokens.  
Perhaps in-group bias is not detected in the full sample because a 50-50 split acts as an 
upper bound on generosity for some subjects.  After eliminating subjects that give 50% 
(or more) of their tokens, a Wilcoxin rank-sum test shows that the in-group and out-group 
distributions are statistically different at the 5% level (p = 0.02).  Using a probit 
regression, the difference in percentage of in-group subjects that give zero tokens (5.7%) 
                                                 
 
42 Fehr and Schmidt (2004) also find significant differences in other-regarding behavior between subject 
pools recruited from different disciplines. 
43 Likewise, the gender effect is identified by in-group non-social science majors, out-group non-social 
science majors, and out-group social science majors, but not in-group social science majors.  The social 




and out-group subjects that give zero tokens (18.3%) is statistically significant at the 10% 
level. 
 
Giving Across All Budget Sets 
 The relationship between in-group and out-group levels of giving is not constant 
across price levels.  In-group subject gave slightly, but not statistically significantly, less 
than out-group subjects when the price of giving was low, but gave substantially more 
when the price of giving was high.  The difference between in-group and out-group 
giving when the price of giving was 2, 3 and 4 is statistically significant at the 5%, 5% 
and 1% level, respectively.  Why do in-group subjects give more when the price of giving 
is high?  It appears that in-group subjects favor payoff equality more so that out-group 
subjects.  Figure 3.4 gives a graphical depiction of the percentage tokens passed by 
treatment across different price levels.  In addition, the choices produced by three 
common utility functions are overlaid on the graph.  These three preference types, U(πs, 
πo) = πs (Selfish), U(πs, πo) = min{πs, πo} (Leontief), and U(πs, πo) = πs + πo (Perfect 
Substitutes) will be discussed further in the following subsection.  The choices of in-
group subjects tend more toward Leontief preferences relative to the choices of out-group 
subjects. 
The regression results in Table 3.4 again show that in-group subjects reacted 
differently to the price changes than did out-group subjects.  When the price of giving 
doubled, out-group subjects decreased their rate of giving by 1.4 tokens, on average, 
while the same price change caused in-group subjects to increase their rate of giving by 
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an average of 3.4 tokens.  The difference in price elasticity is significant at the 1% 
level.44 
 Regressors were added to the price elasticity regression to control for population 
effects.  Notice that the coefficient representing the difference in the price elasticity of 
giving between in-group and out-group subjects remains quite constant under different 
specifications of the regression equation, suggesting that the result is robust. 
 Again, we observe the generosity of science and humanities majors across all 
price levels relative to social science majors.  Over all allocation choices, non-social 
science majors gave an average of 5 or 6 more tokens than social science majors. 
 Also of note is that the coefficients on Female and Log Price * Female are both 
negative, though not statistically significant after controlling for academic discipline.  In 
this data, females give less, on average, than males, and have a lower price elasticity of 
giving than males.  These results do not support the findings of Andreoni and Vesterlund 
(2001) who observe that females are more altruistic at high prices of giving, while males 
are more altruistic at low prices of giving.  
 
Behavioral Clusters/Preference Types 
 Andreoni and Miller (2002) identify clustering of behavior around the previously 
mentioned utility functions, U(πs, πo) = πs (Selfish), U(πs, πo) = min{πs, πo} (Leontief), 
and U(πs, πo) = πs + πo (Perfect Substitutes).  Collectively, these utility functions account 
                                                 
 
44 The term ‘elasticity’ is used loosely.  In this data, there are many instances where Tokens Passed was 
observed to be zero, rendering a true elasticity regression difficult.  The regression aims to measure the 
sensitivity of giving to changes in price, and so the term elasticity fits, at least in spirit. 
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for the behavior of 19 subjects (20%) in the present experiment.45  Following the 
literature, subjects whose behavior does not fit into precisely into one of the three 
preference types are classified as weak selfish, weak Leontief or weak perfect substitutes, 
based on the Euclidean distance between the subjects’ observed behavior and the 
behavior that would result from each of the three utility functions stated above. 
Figure 3.5 illustrates the type classifications that would occur if choices under 
budgets 3 and 4 only were considered.  The x-axis measures tokens passed under budget 
4, while the y-axis measures tokens passed under budget 3.  A subject with Leontief 
preferences would pass 20 tokens when faced with budget 4 and 40 tokens when faced 
with budget 3.  A subject with Perfect Substitutes preferences would pass 60 tokens when 
faced with budget 4 and zero tokens when faced with budget 3.  Of course a Selfish 
subject would pass zero tokens in either case.  In Figure 3.5, bubble sizes represent 
frequencies of actual couplets of choices by subjects in the experiment. 
 The preference types represented by out-group and in-group subjects are 
displayed in Figures 3.6a and 3.6b.  In-group subjects are more likely to display Leontief 
preferences than out-group subjects, see Table 3.5.  This result holds, at the 10% 
significance level, after controlling for academic interest and gender effects.  Also, note 
that science and humanities students are more likely than social science students to 
exhibit Leontief preferences, significant at the 5% level. 
                                                 
 
45 Five subjects were perfectly selfish, 13 subjects displayed Leontief preferences, and one subject 
displayed perfect substitutes preferences.  Andreoni and Miller (2002) report 43% of subjects fit neatly into 
one of the three preference types described above, whereas Fisman et. al. (2007) report that 31.6% of 
subjects exactly fit one of the preference types.  Fisman et. al. (2007) and this experiment share the 
characteristic that subjects entered decisions sequentially on a computer, while Andreoni and Miller (2002) 
used pencil and paper and asked subjects to submit all decisions simultaneously.   This procedural 




 The result that in-group subjects are more likely to display Leontief preferences is 
consistent with the inequity aversion preferences used for the worker in Chapter 2’s 
model of employee ownership.  To see this connection, consider Figures 3.7a and 3.7b.  
Figure 3.7a contains the interpersonal budget constraint that corresponds to budget 4 of 
the dictator game.  The subject can keep all 60 tokens and receive a payoff of 60, give all 
60 away, in which case the recipient gets a payoff of 120, or choose to pass some tokens 
and keep some.  The green lines represent indifference curves for an in-group subject, 
while the red lines represent indifference curves for an out-group subject.  In this case, 
both the in-group and out-group subjects choose to pass 20 tokens.  The indifference 
curves used in Figure 3.7b are identical in slope to the corresponding indifference curves 
in Figure 3.7a.  However, in Figure 3.7b (budget 3) the in-group subject passes 25 tokens, 
while the out-group subject passes only 4.  Two results from the experiment are reflected 
in this example.  First, the in-group subject is classified as displaying Leontief 
preferences (see the point (20, 25) on Figure 3.5), while the out-group subject is 
classified as displaying selfish preferences (see the point (20, 4) on Figure 3.5).  Second, 
at low prices of giving, budget 4, the in-group and out-group subjects display similar 
giving rates, while at high prices of giving, budget 3, the in-group subject gives 
considerably more than the out-group subject. 
 
Trusting and Reciprocal Behavior in the Gift-Exchange Game 
 The backward induction Nash equilibrium of the gift-exchange game consists of a 
zero price offer by the buyer and a zero cost offer by the seller.  As in the dictator game, 
deviations from the Nash equilibrium occur with regularity in laboratory experiments.  A 
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high price offer by the buyer indicates a high level of trust that the seller will respond 
with a generous cost/quality.  Similarly, a high cost choice by the seller indicates a 
propensity to reciprocate a generous action. 
How does in-group bias affect trusting and reciprocal behavior in a gift-exchange 
game?  The average price offered by buyers from the in-group treatment (10.6) is about 
64% higher than the average price offered by buyers from the out-group treatment (6.5), 
see Table 3.6.  The difference in price offers is statistically significant at the 5% level and 
holds after controlling for academic interest and gender.  Figure 3.8 gives the cumulative 
distribution of price offers for both in-group buyers and out-group buyers.  Notice that 
33.7% of out-group buyers offered a price of 0, while only 11.5% of in-group buyers 
offered a price of zero.  The difference is significant at the 5% level using a logit 
regression. 
Is in-group bias in trusting behavior constant over time or do in-group and out-
group trust levels converge?  Figure 3.9 charts the average price chosen by buyers over 
the ten rounds for each treatment.  In-group trust remains relatively constant over time, 
while out-group price levels trend downward before flattening out.  Perhaps out-group 
buyers interpret negative actions by sellers more strongly than in-group buyers do.  
Certainly, the trust levels of in-group and out-group buyers do not seem to converge, a 
fact that is surprising given the actions of in-group versus out-group sellers that we are 
going to consider shortly. 
 Previous studies on gift-exchange games have reported a strong correlation 
between the price offered by the buyer and the cost level of the seller.  This experiment 
was no exception.   Among all sellers, a one point increase in price was associated with 
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an increase in cost by an average of 0.21, a statistic that is significant at the 1% level with 
clustering over subject ID (see the first column of Table 3.7).  The quality of the good 
increased by an average of 0.936 points for every one point increase in the price, also 
significant at the 1% level.  However, because quality increased by less than price, on 
average, a one point increase in price is associated with a (slight and not statistically 
significant) decrease in profit for the buyer. 
 One might conjecture that in-group buyers are more trusting (offer higher prices) 
than out-group buyers because in-group sellers tend to reciprocate with higher cost.  
Surprisingly, this conjecture is not supported by the data.46  Figure 3.10 shows the 
average cost of sellers by treatment for five different ranges of price offers.  Notice that 
there is no trend in terms of which treatment offers the higher cost levels.  The only 
statistically significant difference in cost levels is the second set of bars where the price 
offer is between 5 and 9 points, inclusive.  Figure 3.11 demonstrates the similarity 
between cost responses of in-group and out-group sellers at the median.  Regression 
results confirm that, on average, in-group subjects neither give more cost for a given 
price than out-group subjects, nor change their cost at a different rate than out-groups 
subjects when the price offer changes (see Table 3.7 again).47 
 
                                                 
 
46 Without considering price, the average cost given by in-group sellers (2.74) is statistically significantly 
larger than the average cost of out-group sellers (1.92) at the 10% level.  However, this discrepancy appears 
to be due entirely to the higher price offered by in-group buyers. 
47 Interestingly, female subjects give more cost in general than male subjects, but their cost is less 
dependent on the price offered by the buyer.  Both results are statistically significant at the 5% level. 
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3.6  Discussion and Conclusions 
The results from the gift-exchange game leave two puzzles.  First, why are in-
group buyers more trusting than out-group buyers?  Their behavior is not justified by the 
behavior of the sellers.  One wonders whether this is an anomaly or whether it is 
representative of a broader phenomenon.  Do people systematically misjudge whom they 
should trust? 
Second, why are in-group sellers no more or less generous than out-group sellers?  
Particularly in light of the dictator game results, it is hard to reconcile the fact that there is 
no in-group bias in the actions of sellers.  The following insights could help explain the 
discrepancy.  Perhaps the action of the buyer in the gift-exchange game “crowds out” in-
group effects.  Due to the reciprocal nature of the gift-exchange game, the action of the 
buyer changes the relationship between the buyer and the seller, before the seller makes 
his/her decision.  The buyer’s action would conceivably crowd out in-group effects when 
the in-group bias is weak.  In fact, academic major could be considered a weak grouping 
relative to other groups where members have more interaction with one another. 
Subjects in the experiment appear to value equality more in transactions with 
members of their own group than in transactions with outsiders, and are more trusting of 
members of their own group.  Yet, out-group and in-group subjects display an equal level 
of trustworthiness in a reciprocal environment.  More experimental research is necessary 
to understand how relationships and groups affect behavior in different economic 
situations.  Future theoretical work should take into account the relationship between 




Appendix 2.1 – Proofs 
 
Proposition 1.  Given mij(.), there exists a maximum feasible πj along the line of equality.  
More formally, there exists a πj* such that πj* > πj for all πj that satisfy πj(w,e) = mij(w - 
ui) – w and ui = πj.  In addition, ∂mij/∂ui = -1 at (ui, πj) = (πj*, πj*). 
 
Proof.  We know that the function πj(w,e) = mij(w - ui) – w is concave and downward 
sloping with respect to ui, and limu→-∞π’(.) = 0 and limu→∞π’(.) = ∞ due to the 
assumptions on c(.), y(.) and p(.).  Therefore, there exists a maximum of the expression ui 
+ πj.  The maximum πj conditional on ui = πj is half of the maximum of ui + πj.  
Furthermore, ∂mij/∂ui = -1 at (ui, πj) = (πj*, πj*) because (ui, πj) = (πj*, πj*) maximizes ui + 
πj. 
 
Lemma 1.  Given mij(.) and Ui(ui, πj; aij), there exists an ai*, such that for any aij ≥ ai*, 
the profit maximizing firm will offer the worker the Rawlsian wage, w = w*, and for any 
aij < ai*, the firm will offer the worker a wage strictly less than the Rawlsian wage, w < 
w*. 
 
Proof.  The worker with pure Rawlsian preferences, Ui = min(ui, πj), will always choose a 
point along the line of equity given that πj(w,e) = mij(w - ui) – w is downward sloping.  
Therefore, the Rawlsian wage, w*, is the wage that generates the maximum feasible 
profit along the line of equity, πj*.  The attitude level ai* is that which satisfies the 
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following: -(∂U/∂ui)/(∂U/∂πj) = mij’(w - ui) at the effort level that generates (ui, πj) = (πj*, 
πj*).   
1) For aij ≥ ai*, the profit maximizing firm will offer the worker the Rawlsian 
wage, w = w*, because w* ensures a corner solution, -(∂U/∂ui)/(∂U/∂πj) > 
mij’(w - ui), involving the maximum feasible profit, πj*. 
2) For any aij < ai*, -(∂U/∂ui)/(∂U/∂πj) > mij’(w - ui) = -1 at the point (ui, πj) = 
(πj*, πj*).  The tangency condition ensures that the worker will choose an 
effort level such that –(∂U/∂ui)/(∂U/∂πj) = mij’(w - ui) < -1 and away from the 
line of equity.  Consider a drop in wage by one unit.  There direct increase in 
profit by one unit and an indirect effect on profit due to a decrease in effort by 
the worker.  The wage drop decreases ui by one unit at the worker’s original 
effort level, causing the worker to readjust her effort level to maximize Ui.  
Because the worker, at the margin, is trading one unit of ui for less than one 
unit of πj, the indirect profit loss from lowering the wage is smaller than the 
direct gain.  The firm’s profit maximizing wage is less than w*. 
 
Proposition 2.  For all mij(.) and Ui(ui, πj; aij) where aij ≤ ai*, the firm will choose the 
wage, wij, that satisfies the following: at the wage and effort level that generates ui = πj, –
(∂U/∂ui)/(∂U/∂πj) = mij’(w - ui). 
 
Proof.  Suppose the firm chooses a wage less than wij.  The effort level chosen by the 
worker will generate a corner solution along the line of equity with lower profits than the 
profit generated by wij.  Suppose the firm chooses a wage greater than wij.  –
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(∂U/∂ui)/(∂U/∂πj) = mij’(w - ui) < -1 since aij ≤ ai*.  Therefore, the profits generated by w 
> wij will be less than the profits generated by wij because the direct profit loss due to 
raising the wage is larger than the indirect profit gain generated by higher effort. 
 
Theorem 1.  Suppose that the worker's preferences satisfy the standard assumptions of 
completeness, transitivity and continuity.  Suppose that in the domain of advantageous 
inequality the worker regards πj positively and preferences are homothetic, quasi-convex 
and satisfy the single-crossing property, and in the domain of disadvantageous 
inequality, the worker regards πj non-positively.  Finally, suppose that 0 < ai1 < ai* and 
ai1 < ai2.  Then, 
 
1.  wi2 > wi1 
2.  (a) For all w > wi1, ei2(w) > ei1(w) 
     (b) For all w ≤ wi1, ei2(w) = ei1(w) 
3.  ei2 > ei1 
4.  πi2 > πi1 
5.  ui2 > ui1 
6.  U(ui2, πi2; ai2) > U(ui1, πi1; ai1) 
Proof. 
1) Suppose ai2 ≥ ai*.  By Lemma 1, wi2 = w* and wi1 < w*.  Therefore, wi2 > wi1.  
Suppose ai2 < ai*.  We know that –(∂U/∂ui; ai2)/(∂U/∂πj; ai2) > –(∂U/∂ui; 
ai1)/(∂U/∂πj; ai1) by definition.  By Proposition 2, wi1 and wi2 must be chosen 
to satisfy –(∂U/∂ui; ai2)/(∂U/∂πj; ai2) = mij’(w - ui) at ui = πj, and –(∂U/∂ui; 
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ai1)/(∂U/∂πj; ai1) = mij’(w - ui) at ui = πj.  Because mij’(w - ui) is strictly 
increasing in w along the line ui = πj for w ≤ w*, it must be that wi2  > wi1. 
2) (a) For all w > wi1, the firm 1 worker’s effort choice is not bounded by ui = πj.  
Therefore, ei2(w) > ei1(w), because –(∂U/∂ui; ai2)/(∂U/∂πj; ai2) > –(∂U/∂ui; 
ai1)/(∂U/∂πj; ai1). 
(b) For all w ≤ wi1, both the firm 1 worker’s and firm 2 worker’s effort choices 
are bounded by ui = πj.  Therefore, ei2(w) = ei1(w). 
3) Both ei2 and ei1 satisfy ui = πj given wi2 and wi1, respectively, by Proposition 2.  
As w increases, a greater effort is required to satisfy ui = πj since ui is 
increasing in w and decreasing in effort, while πj is decreasing in wage and 
increasing in effort. Therefore, wi2 > wi1 implies ei2 > ei1. 
4) Firm 2 has the option to choose wi1 and generate the transaction (ei1, wi1).  
However, firm 2 strictly prefers wi2 and generates the transaction (ei2, wi2) as 
previously shown.  Therefore, (ei2, wi2) must be more profitable than (ei1, wi1) 
or in other words, πi2 > πi1. 
5) Both (ei1, wi1) and (ei2, wi2) satisfy ui = πj.  Therefore, πi2 > πi1 implies ui2 > ui1. 
6) U(uij, πij; aij) is increasing in uij and πij as long as uij ≥ πij, which is always true 
in equilibrium.  Because πi2 > πi1 and ui2 > ui1 (by Theorem 1 (4) and (5)), 




Appendix 2.2 – Figures 
 
1   Figure 2.1: Inequity Aversion Preferences 
 
 




3   Figure 2.3: Wage Offers 
 
 




5   Figure 2.5: w* and a* 
 
 
6   Figure 2.6: Theorem 1
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13   Figure 3.3: Cumulative Distribution of Percentage Tokens Passed in Dictator Games where the 
Price of Giving is One 
  
 
14   Figure 3.4: Average Rate of Giving by Treatment 
 






16   Figure 3.6a: Preference Type Classification by Treatment - In-Group 
 
 






18   Figure 3.7a: Utility Maximization Problem for a Worker with Inequity Aversion Preferences 
Facing Budget 4 
 
 
19   Figure 3.7b: Utility Maximization Problem for a Worker with Inequity Aversion Preferences 






20   Figure 3.8: Cumulative Distribution of Buyer Price Offers by Treatment 
 
 






22   Figure 3.10: Average Seller Cost by Price Range and Treatment 
 
 





Appendix 3.3 – Instructions 
 
The instructions below were read to subjects while the subjects followed along on their 
individual computer screens, with one exception.  The practice questions for the “second 
experiment” were not read aloud.  Subjects read and answered the questions on their own.  
Subjects navigated through the instructions by clicking on a ‘continue’ button.  A dashed 
line indicates that the next lines of instructions were on a new screen.  Brackets indicate a 
line or lines of instructions that were available only in session 1, where there were an odd 




WELCOME!  Please read along on your computer screen while I read aloud.  This 
session will consist of TWO experiments followed by a questionnaire.  In total, this 
session should last approximately 90 minutes. 
 
The first experiment is used to analyze decision making.  The instructions are simple.  If 
you read them carefully and make appropriate decisions, you can earn a considerable 
amount of money. 
 
Your profits from this experiment and the following experiment will be added to your 
show-up fee, which will be revealed later.  The total will be paid to you in private in cash. 
 
Throughout the session you will move between pages by clicking the button on the 
bottom right corner of the screen.  Once you click the button, you will not be able to 
move back to a previous screen.  Therefore, you should be sure about the selections you 




CONFIDENTIALITY: In the questionnaire portion of the session, you will be asked to 
enter your name.  Your name will be maintained separately from both your questionnaire 
answers and your experiment decisions.  It will be linked by a subject number. 
 
Your participation, decisions and answers in this session will remain confidential. 
 
ANONYMITY: All decisions made in this session will be made anonymously.  To help 
maintain anonymity, please refrain from sharing information about your choices and 




EXPERIMENT 1: This experiment will consist of 16 rounds.  In each round you will 





subject.  At no point will you know the identity of the other subject, nor will the other 
subject know your identity. 
 
In this experiment your earnings, or profits, will be counted in points.  Every point that a 
subject earns will be worth $0.06 or 6 cents.  For example, if you earn 58 points, you will 




TAKE-HOME PROFITS: Each of you will make a decision in 16 rounds.  AT THE END 
of the 16 rounds, ONE round will be randomly selected by the computer.  We will call 
this round the “payment round.”  The computer will then randomly select half of the 
participants in the room [ODD: minus one, because there is an odd number of 
participants].  We will call these participants “decision makers.”  The choices of the 
decision makers in the payment round will be carried out. 
 
A participant who is not selected to be a decision maker is called a “non-decision maker.”  
Each non-decision maker will be paired with a decision maker.  The decision maker will 
receive the number of points corresponding to the "Your Profit" line on the decision 
maker's computer during the payment round.  The non-decision maker will receive the 
number of points corresponding to the "Recipient Profit" line on the DECISION 
MAKER'S computer during the payment round.  The profit lines referred to above will be 
explained shortly. 
 
To be clear, if you are selected to be a non-decision maker, your choices will have no 
effect on your earnings or the earnings of any other subject.  Therefore, you should make 
your decision in each round as though you are the decision maker. 
 
[ODD: Because there is an odd number of participants in this session, a single, randomly 
chosen participant will neither be a decision maker nor non-decision maker.  That 




ROUNDS 1 – 11: In each of the first 11 rounds, you will face choices similar to the box 
below. 
 
In this example, you must divide 50 tokens.  You can keep all of the tokens, keep some 
and pass some, or pass all of the tokens.  In this example, you will receive 1 point for 
every token you hold, and the other subject will receive 2 points for every token you pass. 
 
If, for example, you hold 50 and pass 0 tokens, you will receive 50 points, or 50 x $0.06 
= $3.00, and the other subject will receive no points and $0.  If you hold 0 tokens and 
pass 50, you will receive 0 points and $0 and the other subject will receive 50 x 2 = 100 






You may choose any number between 0 and 50 to hold.  For instance, you could choose 
to hold 29 tokens and pass 21.  In this case, you would earn 29 points, or 29 x $0.06 = 
$1.74.  The other subject would receive 21 x 2 = 42 points, or 42 x $0.06 = $2.52. 
 
Please feel free to use a calculator to calculate points or to assure that all of the tokens 
have been allocated.  The total must equal 50.  You may also use the computer's 
calculator by clicking on the calculator button on the left side of the screen. 
 
Please choose a number of tokens to hold and a number of tokens to pass in the example 




DISPLAY: The box you see below is similar to the screen you will see after you enter 
your selections in each round.  The number of tokens you chose to hold, and the number 
you chose to pass are listed.   
 
The hold value and pass value of the current round are listed along with your profits and 




ROUNDS 12-16: Thank you for completing the first practice round. 
 
In rounds 12 though 16, the number of tokens held and the number of tokens passed will 
be set.  You will be asked to select the value, in points, of each token.  In these last five 
rounds, tokens always have the same value for you as they do for the other subject.  The 




PRACTICE EXAMPLE 2: In this example, you will hold 8 tokens and pass 4 tokens.  
You must choose a token value.  If you choose a token value of 10, you will receive 8 x 
10 = 80 points, or 80 x $0.06 = $4.80.  The other subject will receive 4 x 10 = 40 points 
or 40 x $0.06 = $2.40. 
 
If you choose a token value of 0, you will receive 0 points and $0.  The other subject will 
receive 0 points and $0 as well. 
 
If, for example, you choose a token value of 6, you will receive 8 x 6 = 48 points, or 48 x 
$0.06 = $2.88.  The other subject will receive 4 x 6 = 24 points, or 24 x $0.06 = $1.44. 
 








DISPLAY: The box you see below is similar to the screen you will see after you make a 
selection in rounds 12 through 16. 
 
The number of tokens held and passed are listed.  The token value that you selected is 
listed as both the hold value and the pass value.  Your profits and the profits of the 




Thank you for completing the second practice round. 
 
We are now ready to begin the first experiment.  You may proceed through the rounds at 





The first experiment has concluded.  Your earnings from the first experiment will be 




EXPERIMENT 2: We are now ready to begin the second experiment.  Once again, the 
instructions are simple.  If you read them carefully and make appropriate decisions, you 
can earn a considerable amount of money. 
 
Again, you will not be able to move back to a previous screen after you have pressed the 
button on the bottom right corner of the screen.  You should be sure about the selections 
you have made before you proceed. 
 
All decisions will be made anonymously. 
 




STAGES: This experiment will consist of 10 [8] rounds.  Each round will consist of three 
stages.  Over the course of the three stages, a seller will sell a fictitious good to a buyer. 
 
        Stage 1:  The buyer will be asked to select the price of the good, in points.  The price 
may be any integer between and including 0 and 25. 
 
        Stage 2:  The price, which was selected by the buyer, will be presented to the seller.  
The seller will then be asked to select the cost of the good, in points.  The cost may be 






        Stage 3:  The cost, price and quality of the good will be presented to both the buyer 




PROFITS: The buyer's profits, in points, will be equal to the quality of the good minus 
the price that the buyer pays for the good. 
 
      Buyer's Profits = Quality - Price 
 
The seller's profits, in points, will be equal to the price of the good minus the cost of 
producing the good. 
 
      Seller's Profits = Price - Cost 
 
QUALITY: Quality and cost are both measured in points.  Quality depends on the cost 
that is chosen by the seller.  The table below gives the quality of the good for different 
levels of cost.  The same cost and quality table will be used in every round. 
 





ASSIGNMENT OF ROLE: The computer has randomly assigned each of you to be either 
a buyer or a seller as indicated below. 
 
The random assignment of role in this experiment is completely independent of your 
earnings in the previous experiment. 
 
If you are a buyer, you will remain a buyer for all rounds.  Likewise, if you are a seller, 
you will remain a seller for all rounds. 
 
Each buyer will be paired with a DIFFERENT seller in every round.  A buyer will never 
be paired with the same seller more than once.  A seller will never be paired with the 
same buyer more than once. 
 
[ODD: Because there is an odd number of subjects in this session, there will be one more 




TAKE-HOME PROFITS: At the end of the stated number of rounds, the computer will 
randomly select one round to be carried out.  We will call this round the “payment 





The seller that is not participating in the payment round will receive a pre-determined 
payment for participating in this experiment.] 
 
Each of you will receive a show-up fee of $18 for participating in this session. 
 
If your profits from this experiment are positive, they will be added to your earnings from 
the previous experiment and your show-up fee.  The sum will be paid to you in private in 
cash. 
 
NEGATIVE PROFITS: In this experiment it is possible to make negative profits. 
 
If your profits are negative, your earnings from the previous experiment will be added to 





PRACTICE QUESTIONS: Please answer the following three practice questions to check 
your understanding of the instructions.  Proceed through the questions at your own pace. 
 
If you do not see a message after you answer a question, then you have selected the 
correct answer.  If you are unsure of an answer, it is okay to take a guess.  If you submit a 
wrong answer, you will have the opportunity to change your selection. 
 
Question 1: Can the seller see the price of the good before he/she selects the cost of the 




Question 2: In how many rounds will a buyer be paired with a particular seller? 




Question 3: Please refer to the profit functions and cost-quality chart above. 
 
A calculator is available by clicking the calculator button on the left side of the screen. 
 
If the buyer selects a price of 16 and the seller selects a cost of 7… 
What are the profits of the buyer? _______ 




READY TO BEGIN:  We are now ready to begin the experiment.  When prompted, 







Thank you for completing the second experiment.  We are now ready to begin the 
questionnaire.  Your name will be maintained separately from your questionnaire 
responses and your experiment decisions. 
 
Please take your time on the questionnaire.  Payments will be made and participants will 






First Name _______________ 




Thank you for completing the decision making portion of this session.  Please take a 
moment to compete this questionnaire while the experimenter calculates the payments to 
be made to each subject.  Your information and answers in this questionnaire will NOT 
affect your earnings and will remain strictly confidential. 
 
The questionnaire is made up of two parts and should take approximately 10 minutes to 
complete. 
 














If other, please explain: _________________ 
 
Please enter your major: _________________ 
 









○ Below 2.0 
 
Do you live in on-campus housing? 
○ Yes 
○ No 
If yes, please enter your dormitory: ________________ 
 







○ Asian/Pacific Islander 
○ Native American 
○ Other 
If other, please explain: __________________ 
 
What is your household income, including all earners in your household?  (This question 
refers to your permanent residence.) 
○ Less than $40,000 
○ $40,000-$80,000 
○ $80,000-$120,000 
○ More than $120,000 
 
What is your religious affiliation? 
○ Protestant Christian 
○ Roman Catholic 







If other, please explain: ___________________ 
 
What is the highest level of education your mother has completed? 
○ Less than High School 
○ High School/GED 
○ Some College 





○ 4-Year College Degree (BA, BS) 
○ Master’s Degree 
○ Doctoral Degree 
○ Professional Degree (MD, JD) 
○ Other 
If other, please explain: ______________________ 
 
What is the highest level of education your father has completed? 
○ Less than High School 
○ High School/GED 
○ Some College 
○ 2-Year College Degree (Associates) 
○ 4-Year College Degree (BA, BS) 
○ Master’s Degree 
○ Doctoral Degree 
○ Professional Degree (MD, JD) 
○ Other 




You will be asked to assess your familiarity and friendliness with, and your attitude 




For each fellow subject in today's session, please choose the category that best describes 
your FAMILIARITY with that person.  Feel free to use the scratch paper provided to 
keep track of your tally as you look around the room.  For each category, enter the 
number of fellow subjects with whom your familiarity fits the description.  The number 
of fellow subjects entered in the six categories MUST TOTAL 19 [14]. 
 
Completely foreign, have never seen the person before:   ______ 
Vaguely familiar, have seen the person once or twice:   ______ 
Familiar looking, see the person around somewhat regularly: ______ 
Familiar, spend time around the person on occasion:   ______ 
Very familiar, regularly spend time around the person:   ______ 
Highly familiar, spend significant time around the person daily:  ______ 
Do the entries in the six boxes above total 19 [14]?   ○ Yes 
 
Question 2: 
For each fellow subject in today's session, please choose the category that best describes 
the FRIENDLINESS of your interactions with that person.  Feel free to use the scratch 
paper provided to keep track of your tally as you look around the room.  For each 
category, enter the number of fellow subjects with whom your friendliness fits the 






Not applicable, have rarely or never interacted with the person:  ______ 
Unfriendly, interactions have been negative in nature:   ______ 
Neutral, interactions have neither been positive nor negative in nature: ______ 
Somewhat friendly, interactions have been somewhat positive:  ______ 
Friendly, interactions have been positive and rewarding:   ______ 
Very friendly, interactions have been extremely positive and rewarding: ______ 
Do the entries in the six boxes above total 19 [14]?    ○ Yes 
 
Question 3: 
For each fellow subject in today's session, please choose the category that best describes 
YOUR ATTITUDE toward that person.  Feel free to use the scratch paper provided to 
keep track of your tally as you look around the room.  For each category, enter the 
number of fellow subjects toward whom your attitude fits the description.  The number of 
fellow subjects entered in the five categories MUST TOTAL 19 [14]. 
 
Negative, dislike the person:     ______ 
No opinion/Neutral, neither like nor dislike the person: ______ 
Somewhat positive, like the person somewhat:  ______ 
Positive, like the person:     ______ 
Highly positive, like the person to a substantial degree: ______ 
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